
ON SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRACY

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Introduction. At present, the European Union faces dramatic challenges in its history. The EU's future, which seemed so clear in the past, is now rather uncertain. Over the last five years, the secession trends have become more significant. The research places special emphasis on the efforts to be taken by the Europeans in order to prevent political collapse, and strengthen the Union.

Materials and methods. Currently the EU concerns cause heated debate among analysts and political scientists. The author follows two patterns of theoretical approaches to European problems: the works of prominent theorists – Antony Giddens and Jürgen Habermas. The research is based on the books “Turbulent and Mighty Continent. What Future for Europe?” written by Anthony Giddens in 2015, and “The Crisis of the European Union. Response” by Jürgen Habermas (2012), which express the opinion of these most competent researches on the specific features of democratic processes in Europe and in the EU.

The results of the research. Following the review of the above books, the author concludes that supranational democracy is a matter of great concern. This kind of democracy is interpreted as manifestation of high political culture which, on the one hand, is free from local narrow-mindedness and, on the other hand, lacks one of the main controversies of democracy such as the conflict between the majority's will and the minority interests.

Discussions and conclusion. Based on Giddens' idea of the two-tier system of power existing in modern Europe (Europe of bureaucrats, so-called “Paper Europe” – the EU1, and Europe of effective leaders – the EU2) the author states that successful development the European Union requires the following three tiers of power: 1) the power of administrative institutions (the EU1), 2) the power of effective political leaders (the EU2), and 3) the power of supranational democracy (power of the European people – the EU3).

The author focuses on the unique nature of the European experiment in terms of history, its significance for the prospective political development of other regions of the world, highlights the EU economic, political and anthropological conditions, which may ensure that the development of supranational EU democracy will be a success.

It is doubtful is there even one political leader in the civilized world who consciously and publicly will argue against democracy as such and declare himself as the uncompromising adherent of authoritarianism. Allegiance to the principles of democracy today is an innate character of progressiveness and humanism. It is so not because authorities try to flirt with the people. In sophisticated and streamlined soci-

eties, as European countries are, (especially the EU Member States) the power of people displays itself not only through elections, street actions, and rotation of authorities but through everyday participation in public deeds and civic actions. As M. Foucault fairly said contemporary societies: “Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” [2. P. 266]. But just in

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this everywhere (omnipresence) of power, there is one of its fundamental problems. The essence of this problem consists in the necessity for democracy to overcome its own inclination to populism, in other words, to get over any demonstration of ethnic, confessional, social, corporal and even national narrowness.

It is commonly assumed that one of the main problems of democracy is so-called "problem of a minority". The essence of this problem is this, a democracy legitimizes itself by the will of a majority, but at the same time majority must take into account the minority opinion. The ability to reconcile this contradiction is a criterion of political maturity of democracy. But in this respect, one question is rising: how to combine a will of the majority with the interests of the minority? The answer often presupposes the idea of indifferent tolerance: let minority do what it want if only they do not annoy majority with its strange needs, habits, and inclinations. It means that minority simply is granted specific virtual "reservation" in society. Majority kindly speaks to minority: "if you want to be unique, please be, but only in the special social room. The main rule in your case is to uphold the laws and to pay tax for your security and opportunity to run your life in the framework that a state determines for you as for any other normal groups of citizen". But if we take more attentive look at this problem we can see that in this case minority as such may exist only due to emphasizing itself like a minority in the face of the majority, otherwise their exceptional rights will be canceled. But for stressing its "minority nature" a minority must come out from its "social reservation" to open public room because only here it can solve the question of its uniqueness and get the right for being peculiar.

Thus within the very form of democratic governance, there is a systemic contradiction, and it means that it produces itself permanently. Cultural underground, gay parades, demonstration of trans-sexuality and other demonstrations of various minorities' habits, the majority estimates as a threat to the standard social norms. Besides the purpose of scandalous self-expression this kind of demonstrations send to society also the message that minorities want to have the same equal rights as, so-called, normal majority has, generally it is the right to be not within the fences of the social reservation, moreover to live in society where there are no fences at all. In other words, the attitude of the majority to the habits of minorities is an indicator of real tolerance.

According to valuable acknowledgement of Canadian political philosopher Will Kym-

licka: "The problem is that most liberals have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that individuals will achieve their freedom and equality within the majority culture; that minority culture would and should disappear; and hence that modern states would, over time, become "nation-state", with a common language and national Identity"[10. P. 135].

But real tolerance does not tolerate any social fences, any conditional arguments, no double-thinking. The only difference that can be adopted is the difference of personalities as simply human beings, and the only one type of ideas and convictions is prohibited that is the hated-based ideology. This is the only way to reconcile and annihilate the very core of contradiction of "majority - minority" and to establish the principle of unconditional egalitarianism. The basic principles of such kind of egalitarianism, to our mind, clearly generalized researcher of the problems of multiculturalism E.Karsanova. According to her view these principles are as follows: "1) the recognition of ethnic and cultural pluralism as the main characteristic of civil society by the state; 2) the assistance in socialization of marginal cultural groups; 3) the assertion of standards of social justice of each representative of national culture (equal opportunities for all citizens of the country); 4) the support of reproduction and development of ethnic cultures... 5) the incorporation of different ethnical population in social institutes is possible by its active inclusion in social reproduction... which is understood as the reproduction of the person and social communities in all variety of their social qualities..." [9. P 23, 25].

When we speak about unconditional egalitarianism as a democratic principle in relation to the European Union we should bear in mind that the kind of democracy that is free from the contradiction between majority and minority is not a matter of some most advanced countries that can be taken as an example for others. In this case, it is meant so-called supranational democracy as real and coming up phenomenon. European political development now is going to particularly this and unique direction. It is unique because Europe is facing now with the task which was never before in the history. This is the task to build an unprecedented political universal unit which could represent the unity of diversity. This kind of unity must be free from enforced unification, and also free from any kind of priorities and benefits for the citizens of the EU in terms of their participation in public and political life.

History knows many examples of establishing large-scale universalization which crucially

changed the world. Great Ancient and Medieval Empires united peoples mainly by force, but it was historically restricted and local universality. Capitalism brought about new (economic) opportunities and means for universality produced global empires divided into centers and peripheries. The United States in Philadelphia at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 actually realized the idea of universalism on political (democratic) and juridical base. As Arthur Schlesinger wrote: "The men who established the United States of America believed that they trying something new under the sun. The idea that a democratic republic might endure ran against all the teachings in history. The vindication of this idea, said Washington in his first inaugural was "an experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people". The founders were far from sure of success. Can we be certain even today that the experiment has succeeded? At least it has lasted for two centuries, and that is something"[12. P. X]. At the same time we have to agree that 13 States of America despite their economic and cultural differences were in general similar as people are on the same street at the city of the XVIII century. Contemporary consolidated Europe is a union of different nature.

The EU not only has avoided an imperial fate of association by force, not only like the United States seeks to create common political civic ground, but, the main thing is that the EU meets the challenge which has no analogy in history. It has to unite European peoples which have extremely different cultural features, languages, historical memories, economic levels of development and, using Hegel's words, even different national spirit. If the United States historical experiment has defined a trajectory of political development of the XX century than we can say without exaggeration that European experience will be in great demand by future mankind. For Europe, there is no better alternative, than association on supranational democracy.

Unfortunately, at the moment the European Union representing itself as a sprout of the future all-European political community, is mainly united not by democratic but bureaucratic means, and it is its main political problem. Bureaucracy (if just we take an effective bureaucracy) is representing, according to Hegel "a general class". Its purpose is "to preserve general interests of the society", [6. P. 243]. That is why it cannot create organic society and state. Reliance on bureaucracy is an attempt to build up society from above. As far as a social being is an organic whole it must be built from both

opposite sides: from the ground by the people and from above by their leaders. This is the only way to join European nations in supranational "Community of Fate" [4].

Of course, the EU at the moment is far from the ideal of the united and indivisible unit. But its experience is important for all because it discloses the problems of contemporary democracy and shows how Europeans are searching the ways of their solution. One of the serious problems is the problem of substantial economic differences between its members that cause the problem of justice in "Europe of different speeds".[3] To be more concrete it is a problem of equal distribution of benefits and loss that occurs in the process of European consolidation. But we have to remark that economic differences are generally quantitative and have a tendency to become smoother. In opposite cultural differences in terms of values and historical memory are qualitative, deep and inertial. "Throughout history, each the EU member has shaped its own society, which embodies diverse forms of multicultural coexistence that cannot be modified without the risk of social tensions and popular discontent. Faced with such perspectives, governments may prefer to allow these deep evolutions to take shape in an unforced way over time through quiet persuasion rather than foster a public debate about the definition of immigration quotas" [15, P.14]. To overcome these differences it will take time on condition that European people and their leaders will demonstrate political will for concord.

One of the algetic problems causes social tension in Europe is a problem if migration. The majority of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians hardly agree that their countries have to share the common burden of overseas migration. According to European Commission plan in 2015, Latvia had to adopt 737 migrants, Lithuania - 710 and Estonia - 1064 [7]. These figures are modest, but in public opinion, there is growing concern that it is only the beginning of an undesirable process and in future quotas will rise. The problem is not in that the migrants may affect national culture and cause, so called, mutation of the indigenous code of cultural self-identification, but that the decision for migrant adaptation was not made by domestic people, on "behalf of them" it had been made by bureaucrats from Brussels.

It sounds strange for people who believe that the more West means the more democracy, Anthony Giddens asserts: "To put things badly, the Union suffers from a simultaneous lack of democracy and effective leadership. Three main institutions in the EU are the Commission,

the Council and the Parliament" [4. P. 7], and (using famous words) "they are very far from the people" (Lenin). "Moreover, citizens are nowhere directly involved. European elections are fought largely on national issues. The turnout of the elections is low because voters are well aware of the situation. The parliament tends to operate on the sidelines its procedures obscure to the wider public. National leaders, especially of the larger countries, often want to have their cake and eat it" [4. P. 7]. Giddens calls the EU "a functionalist enterprise, driven by results rather than affection, let alone passion" [4. P. 6]. Bureaucratic mechanism of governance is at the moment the main one, which can fasten and consolidate formally the EU countries, but it is too weak to forge the feeling of united fate. Such kind of feeling may appear not of good wishes and hopes but through overcoming common problems, losses, disasters and tragedies. Of course, bureaucratic functionalism is undoubtedly better as the mean of political unification than Charlemagne sword, Napoleon cannons or Nazi tanks. But it is only the first step. In real political practice, this condition must be added with the development of democracy "without benefits and exceptions for anybody". This principle must be spread over Europe and bring into life a supranational democracy, the right kind of democracy that Kant was dreaming about when he wrote on the theory of cosmopolitan civil society.

On supranational European democracy

Anthony Giddens in his book, mentioned above, says about two levels of governance in the EU, which he defines as the EU1 and the EU2. The EU1 is an official structure that was designed by "method" Monnet (European Commission, Council and Parliament and other institutions). Their task is to govern normatively, in other words, to do what must be. The EU2 in opposite non-bureaucratic structure which includes recognized European authorities, leaders of leading countries (like Chancellor of Germany, President of France and leaders of few other countries). Their duty is to run the EU as it is. EU1 Giddens calls "Paper Europe". In analogy, the EU2 might be called "Situational Europe". Both structures are necessary and complement each other, but they are not sufficient. Apparently, one more structure is necessary. It is the EU3, which represents the direct activity of the people. So these three elements might compose sophisticated mechanism of power in the EU: a power of bureaucracy, power of leaders and power of the peoples.

But what is it "a power of the peoples" in terms of European political context? Europe embraces no one single people, but peoples. It is impossible to forge the EU3 only through official cultural contacts like museum and theater delegations, festivals and shopping tours. The question is more serious. This process, which will take a long time, needs coherence of several conditions.

The first one is a creation of common the EU political space, which must be based on unconditional human rights. We may state a fact that such kind of space already exists though its political force is not too strong. Due to controversial political consequences (a tendency, on the one hand, to division and, and, on the other hand, de facto to integration), European citizens "have become aware of their interdependence. There is for the first time a European political space" [4. P. 8]. There are many problems that Europeans can solve jointly, for instance, the problems of migration and terrorism, environmental security and alternative energy etc. In domestic scale, it is a problem of huge labor and educational commuting. Its influence will increase in the future. Further European integration, in addition, will bring into life new problems, among them are custom controls, application of international law, coordination of monetary policy, environmental cooperation and a multitude of others [4. P. 14].

The second condition is the human rights. It is difficult not to agree with J. Habermas, that human being must live, feel and act according to his or her self-judgment [5]. This self-judgment has a priority before other rights of any social subjects including the state. The idea of unconditional human rights conveyed in this philosophical background of contemporary Europe like perpetual motion machine gives impetus to European spirit and serves for searching non-violent and legal mechanisms and methods of beautification of European societies.

More that 70 years Europe is living in peace (except local military conflicts in Balkans and Eastern Ukraine). Peaceful co-existence already became invaluable political wealth for Europeans. That is why any manifestation of militarism and blast of terrorism in their cities and towns became a matter of alarm for them. Though we can witness there from time to time the blast of terrorist violence and street disorders, nevertheless coercive methods of elimination of social and political conflicts became in general non-systemic. In other words, coercion is neither reproduced by the logic of domestic policy nor by the logic of international relations between European countries.

The principle of non-violence which determines official European policy so much is, however, one of the cultural and historical superstructures of deeper meta-cultural basis which has been reproducing in European history during a long time and in most vivid form. I mean the principle of human dignity. J. Habermas determines this characteristic feature in scientific mode as the “concept of human dignity” [5]. Let’s remark that this true and deepest essence of European culture for the first time occurred as a real “concept” in ancient sophist teaching of Protagoras who put a man in the centre of the Universe as the measure of all things. Apparently, this “concept” is a real clue to the mystery of European civilization and it gave Kant hope to believe that “we shall discover a regular process of improvement in the political constitutions of our continent (which will probably legislate eventually for all other continents)” [8. P. 52].

Despite very controversial European history which is indeed full of inhuman cruelty,

Kant is likely true; the progress of social good never goes straight and gradually. It is a non-linear process, and it looks like winding road that leads us from starting point when different local societies fight each other for priorities of their local values, towards universal society as such.

Habermas’ optimistic attitude concerning European “concept” of human dignity looks quite convincing. To his mind, the well-thought-out concept of human dignity facilitates consensus between peoples with the different cultural ground. The reason for that “idealistic” belief consists in self-feeling of dignity, which is reflective and transitional simultaneously by its nature and gives the opportunity for bilateral recognition as a condition for positive communication and concerted actions of European societies. An important European experience, we hope, will serve for developing supranational democracy as a prospective cosmopolitan phenomenon.

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О НАДНАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ДЕМОКРАТИИ

Введение. В настоящее время Европейский Союз переживает сложный и драматический период в своей истории. Его будущее, еще недавно казавшееся вполне ясным, сегодня представляется не столь безоблачным. За последние несколько лет тенденция к разобщению внутри ЕС проявляется все сильнее. Что должны делать европейцы, чтобы предотвратить движение к расколу, как укрепить единство Союза, - таковы центральные вопросы данной статьи.

Материалы и методы. В настоящий момент проблемы Европейского Союза вызывают жаркие дискуссии среди политологов. Автор рассматривает два теоретических подхода к анализу этих проблем, которые изложены в работах выдающихся европейский теоретиков, Энтони Гидденса и Юргена Хабермаса. За основу своего исследования автор берет недавно опубликованную монографию Энтони Гидденса «Неспокойны и могущественный континент. Что ждет Европу в будущем?» (2015) и работу Юргена Хабермаса «Эссе о конституции Европы» (2012), в которых оба авторитетных исследователя высказывают свое мнение об особенностях демократического процесса в Европе в целом и в Евросоюзе, в частности.

Результаты. Анализируя эти труды, автор приходит к заключению, что на повестку дня следует поставить проект наднациональной демократии в Евросоюзе. Как проявление высокой политической культуры, этот особый тип демократии характеризуется тем, что, с одной стороны, он свободен от той местечковой узости, которой страдают национальные демократии, а с другой, - от

так называемой «проблемы меньшинства», свойственной господствующей на сегодняшний день парадигме демократии, согласно которой следует беспокоиться о том, чтобы искать способы примирения воли большинства с интересами меньшинства.

Дискуссии и заключение. Опираясь на идею Э.Гидденса о двух уровнях власти в современном Евросоюзе (власти бюрократических институтов, из-за которой он называет эту власть «бумажной Европой», или ЕС1 и власти ее выдающихся лидеров, которую он обозначает как ЕС2), автор выдвигает тезис о том, что для успешного развития необходимо наличие трех уровней власти: власти административных институтов (ЕС1), власти ее эффективных лидеров (ЕС2) и власти самого народа, реализуемой через каналы наднациональной демократии (ЕС3).

В этой связи автор фокусирует внимание на исторической уникальности Европейского эксперимента, его значении для прогрессивного политического развития других мировых регионов, обращает внимание на экономическое, политические и культурно-антропологические условия европейской парадигмы демократии, которые дают возможность надеяться на то, что развитие наднациональной демократии будет успешным.

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Keywords:

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