June, 8, 2023

By Vladimir Kozin, Member, Russian Academy of Military Sciences

On June 2, U.S. Presidential National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan spoke on nuclear missiles’ issues at an international conference held at the Arms Control Association, Washington, DC.

The speaker reiterated the country’s nuclear strategy that was approved in October 2022 by the current U.S. Administration. He stated that the USA will keep intact the central limits on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems until 2026, the year when the New START will expire, but with a significant excuse: if the PRC does not build up the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal. Jake Sullivan promised that the Pentagon would not deploy “ever more dangerous” nuclear weapons, without specifying what he had in mind.

Peculiarities of criticism aimed at Russia and China

A large portion of his remarks was devoted to harsh criticism of Russia’s nuclear policy. He distortedly noted that Russia:

•  suspended the implementation of the New START (he concealed Moscow’s arguments for that move and hidden that Washington was the first who violated it by hiding 101 strategic delivery systems from inspections);
•  stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus (he also abstained to outline the reasons for such action and did not mention that Pentagon is keeping the same type of weapons for nearly 80 years);
•  “seized and attacked” the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant (Russia never shelled it with the U.S HIMARS, but Ukraine did it more than 40 times aiming at destruction of the cooling system and electricity supply grid, and sent five commando group to capture it);
•   announced its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty (the USA has not ratified it while Russia has done);
•  generally, “destabilized the nuclear foundation” laid by the U.S. forebearers even before its “brutal attack” on Ukraine (actually, the USA has destabilized it and brutal combined aggression against Russia was started by Ukraine and NATO in April 2014);
•  advanced the development of dangerous nuclear-powered missiles and torpedoes (the USA does the same), and “destroyed” earlier nuclear arms control agreements (the USA displayed negative attitude towards 15 bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements). 

The rapporteur expressed concern about the People’s Republic of China nuclear missile build-up that – as he predicted – could reach 1,500 nuclear warheads’ ceiling by 2035. Beijing was also accused of avoiding negotiations on nuclear arms control, failing to share data on the size and scope of its nuclear weapons, and to provide ballistic missiles’ launch notifications. True, but the PRC is not a party of the relevant international arrangements.

The presidential adviser noted that for the first time in the nation’s history, the United States is facing two named nuclear powers at the same time. Who has created such situation? Namely, the USA.

Jake Sullivan also recalled the “increasing nuclear threats” from the DPRK and Iran. Pyongyang has been accused of being ready to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, while Tehran has been accused of withdrawing from the joint comprehensive nuclear deal. Strange revelation: the USA was the first who torpedoed it.

New proposals

He proposed to make an emphasis on non-nuclear means: hypersonic and space strike systems, as well as the use of cyberspace for military purposes. Presidential adviser advocated negotiating nuclear issues with the major nuclear powers “from a position of strength.” Will such a way be helpful?

On the other hand, giving lip service to the readiness of the U.S. military and political leadership to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, the speaker outlined some new, but very limited in format approaches to selectively addressing a number of nuclear arms control issues.

He recounted Washington’s willingness:

1) to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia and the PRC “without preconditions,” but stipulated that this did not mean conducting it “without accountability;”

2) to notify Russia in advance of the U.S. ballistic missile launches and major strategic exercises;

3) to enter into a “discussion” with Russia on managing nuclear risks and developing a post-2026 arms control framework;

4) to engage in new multilateral arms control efforts, including through the five permanent members of the UN Security Council;

5) to formalize a missile launch notification regime across the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; 

6) to establish crisis communications channels between the capitals of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; 

7) to commit to transparency on nuclear policy, doctrine, and budgeting;

8) to set up guardrails for managing the interplay between non-nuclear strategic capabilities and nuclear deterrence;

9) to continue to be laser focused with the U.S. NATO Allies on modernizing the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities – from ensuring broad participation in the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent mission, to certifying F-35 aircraft to be able to deliver modern nuclear gravity bombs, including B 61-12.

The organizers carefully shielded Jake Sullivan from numerous questions: he was asked only four of them: two by the media and two put by the expert community.

Shortcomings of proposals

Jake Sullivan did not specify which of the most dangerous nuclear weapons the Pentagon would refuse to deploy.

Paragraph 1 mentioned here is unclear: what kind of “accountability” and what would it consist of, if it says there are no “preconditions” for an arms control dialogue with Russia and the PRC?

Paragraph 2 is clear, except one factor: what does it mean major strategic exercises?

Paragraph 3 proposes entering into a “discussion” on eliminating nuclear risks and defining a framework for arms control after 2026; as we know, any discussions are different from negotiations and do not produce solutions.

Paragraph 4 proposes a “new effort” in multilateral arms control involving the five nuclear-weapon states. What does this effort amount to?

It is not clear: between which Government agencies of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is it proposed to establish “crisis communication channels” (paragraph 6)?

What should be the obligations for transparency in nuclear policy, strategies, and budgeting of the parties – open or classified to the general public and to what extent (paragraph 7)?

What are “the guardrails” (or limitations) for managing the interaction between non-nuclear strategic capabilities and nuclear deterrence mentioned in paragraph 8.

Paragraph 9 has additional questions as well: where and how many already certified nuclear-capable F-35 will be deployed by the USA and its allies in Europe and Indo-Pacific?

These proposals completely missed the U.S. position on the “launch-on-warning” strategy of its first nuclear strike against Russia and the PRC; continued patrols in Europe and Asia by American heavy nuclear strategic bombers; permanent deployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; revival of national nuclear-tipped medium-range missiles; continued NATO Air Forces’ Baltic Air Policing and South European Air Policing operations employing the DCA or dual-capable aircraft capable to carry nuclear weapons.

Conclusions

All proposals tabled by Jake Sullivan are put forward for the sake of their empty placement; they require additional clarifications from the U.S. side.

These “new proposals” are selective in nature. They do not include U.S. approaches to other arms control issues bearing strategic significance.

His proposals require more straight-forward questions and crystal-clear answers to be given from Washington.

There are two obvious black goals emerging from his notions painted in white:

first, to draw the PRC into a dubious dialogue with the USA on nuclear arms control by any means;

and, second, to undermine the national security of the Russian Federation and the PRC by all these carefully camouflaged “proposals”.